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REMARKS ON THE PRESENTATIONS BY
PROFESSORS SHAPIRO AND LEVIN
MARY M. SCHROEDER†
I welcomed the invitation to join this program with alacrity
because I have great respect for Duke University. I also have
enormous respect for Ab Mikva, as a jurist, lawyer, congressperson,
and friend. He is also a fellow graduate of the University of Chicago
Law School, and one who shares my occasional skepticism about the
economic philosophy with which the school has come to be
1
associated.
I recall having breakfast with Ab many years ago when he was on
the D.C. Circuit. Ab told me I was too young to be a circuit judge and
that I would soon find it boring. Let me take this opportunity as the
Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit to make clear that this job is never
boring.
SHAPIRO ESSAY: OUTSOURCING GOVERNMENT REGULATION

2

The thesis, as I understand it, is that an agency will adopt the
regulation that costs it the least to promulgate. This is driven by the
assumption that the administrators are motivated by the desire to
save money. I don’t buy into the thesis. To the extent that I have
studied economic models a bit, my understanding is that private
industry wants to use the least expensive means of operation in order
to reap profits and beat the competition.
Now why would the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) want to make a profit? How could
they make a profit? And, if they were not interested in making
profits, then why would they engage in an analysis of which regulation
Copyright © 2003 by Mary M. Schroeder
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is cheaper to promulgate? It seems to me what the agency might do,
and probably should do, is determine which regulation is cheaper to
administer. But, I must say more cynically, what is more likely is that
the agency will opt for the regulation that is the least expensive for
the regulated industry to follow. To me, that is the most intractable
problem of administrative law: the tendency of agencies to become
the captives of the industries they regulate. It is also why Article III
judges—the Federal Circuit, of course, excepted—have never
favored, and have generally opposed, specialized federal courts. It is
because of the fear that such courts will become captive to the
industries they serve. For example, some have argued there is too
close a relationship between the patent bar, the patent office, and the
Federal Circuit.3 So I agree absolutely that economic interests are
heavily implicated in regulatory decisions. The question is whose
economic interests? I would submit it too often is not the regulators’
interests or the taxpayers’ interests, but the interests of those being
regulated. In my view, outsourcing would make the problem patent,
not latent. That, to me, would not be much of an improvement.
LEVIN ARTICLE: “VACATION” AT SEA

4

A major thesis, as I understand it, is that courts should have the
authority to remand a regulation without vacating it in limited cases
where the equities warrant it. Professor Levin makes a very good
point that if a court holds that a regulation was improperly
promulgated, but nevertheless keeps it in place, it is in effect
approving retroactive rulemaking. Such a holding also effectively
denies relief to the party that challenged the regulation. He advocates
leaving the regulation in place in those circumstances where the
equities warrant it and cautions courts to balance the equities
carefully. I agree.
5
I was on the panel in Western Oil & Gas Association v. EPA,
6
where the court remanded without vacating. In Western Oil, the court
held that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) failed to
comply with the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative
3. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts,
64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 26–30 (1989) (evaluating criticism that the Federal Circuit has a pro-patent
bias).
4. 53 DUKE L.J. 291 (2003).
5. 633 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1980).
6. Id. at 812–13.
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Procedure Act (APA) when it designated certain areas as
7
nonattainment areas under the Clean Air Act. The panel remanded
the case to the EPA to comply with the APA, but decided to leave
8
the designations in place. We concluded that remand without
vacation was appropriate (1) to avoid thwarting the operation of the
Clean Air Act while the proper deliberation occurred, (2) to avoid
undesirable consequences that the court could not predict, and (3) to
minimize the court’s intrusion into complex environmental
regulation.9 I do not think Professor Levin would seriously disagree
that doing so was appropriate in this case.
Where I have a little more difficulty with the Article is that, as I
understand it, Professor Levin also advocates vacating the regulation
when the regulation violates substantive provisions of the governing
statute. That raises a very difficult problem of how courts should
determine whether the regulation violates a statute. It is often not
clear.
A case in point that Professor Levin cites is United States v.
10
Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative. There the Supreme Court
reversed a decision of a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals panel of
which I was a member. The panel was reviewing an injunction issued
by a district judge in California, barring the distribution of marijuana
11
by an Oakland cooperative to persons suffering from cancer. We
upheld the overall injunction but instructed the district court to make
an equitable exception for persons for whom marijuana was a
“medical necessity.”12 We said that courts have general equitable
powers to tailor injunctions, and that this statute did not say Congress
intended to do away with that equitable discretion with respect to
injunctions dealing with marijuana.13
The Supreme Court turned our reading of the statute on its head
and said that because Congress did not include a medical necessity
exception, the courts have no discretion to create one, even in the
exercise of equitable discretion to tailor injunctions to the needs of a
14
specific situation. Professor Levin cites the Supreme Court case as
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 812.
Id. at 813.
Id.
532 U.S. 483 (2001).
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 190 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1115.
Id. at 1114.
Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 496–97.
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an example of when courts must vacate a regulation because it is
contrary to the statute the agency, or in this case, the court, is
15
enforcing. We thought in Oakland Cannabis that providing for a
medical necessity exception was not contrary to the statute because
Congress had not said that courts could not act in their usual way in
fashioning equitable relief.16 We thought we were doing justice and
following congressional will. The Supreme Court took the opposite
view and said that since Congress did not specifically authorize an
exception, our injunction was contrary to the Act.
So my question to Professor Levin would be: Do you have an
easy way to determine whether a regulation is contrary to the statute?
In Oakland Cannabis, we thought that we had done a very sensible
thing that was in accord with congressional wishes because Congress
wanted to take into account exigencies that might develop through
medical research. Courts can take such exigencies into account in
fashioning equitable remedies, but Congress must write in general
terms and with reference only to the situation it perceives at the time
of drafting the statute.
I still think our court’s decision was fully justified in that case. In
my view, Congress meant to ban the distribution of marijuana for use
to get high, not to bar its distribution to relieve the suffering of the
17
terminally ill. More recently, in Conant v. Walters, we held that an
injunction to protect the First Amendment rights of doctors to discuss
and recommend medical use of marijuana was proper. This medical
marijuana case was greeted as a sensible decision.18
So, overall, I agree with Professor Levin that courts should have
the discretion to remand without vacating a regulation, particularly
when the flaw in the regulation’s enactment was not related to the
agency’s legal authority to adopt such a regulation. I just do not agree
with the suggestion that such legal issues of agency authority are very
easy when they involve highly charged questions of
statutory interpretation.

15. See Levin, supra note 4, at 339–42.
16. Oakland Cannabis, 190 F.3d at 114.
17. 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 387 (2003).
18. For discussion of this case and some of the immediate reactions to the decision, see,
e.g., Adam Liptak, Medical Marijuana Wins a Court Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at A20;
Pamela A. MacLean, Circuit Backs Doctors Who Prescribe Pot, S.F. DAILY J., Oct. 30, 2002, at
A1.

